The resolution of a number of important questions in medical ethics is often thought to least open to discussion, it is no more certain than decision i. Consequently, the definitional strategy of focusing attention almost exclusively on the definition in an effort to resolve the ethical disagreement is doomed to failure because it begs the question at issue between the two parties. For those who agree on the principle and disagree on decision i, the precise definition of death merely covers over the real source of their disagreement, viz, the reasons they might offer for accepting or rejecting decision i. In a word, if reasonable people are at odds about the morality of treating, or not treating, a patient they cannot hope to resolve their disagreement by first adopting a new linguistic convention.
Alternative strategy If the definitional strategy for smothering ethical disagreement is a mistake, the explanation of the mistake involved might point the way towards a more successful strategy for resolving ethical dilemmas. The dodging manoeuvre tends to be made in the ordinary language context of well accepted ethical norms. The inexactness of some of the key concepts on which we rely to express our ethical intuitions makes for a poor fit, in many cases, between our moral principles and developing medical practice. To cope with this, we are tempted to redefine the relevant inexact concepts and then apply our ethical norms as before. The main attraction in tbis seems to be the apparent certainty of definitions vis-&-vis the uncertainty of moral intuitions.
There is a tradition in philosophical thinking which regards definitons as unassailable, a tradition which finds expression in the theory of analytic propositions. That this tradition itself rests on a mistake has been ably demonstrated by W V 0 Quine. 5 Rather than short circuit the discussion of ethical i88 Dolores Dooley Clarke, Desmond M Clarke dilemmas by redefining inexact concepts, we should reexamine the moral norms which provoke the problems in the first place and ask, for example, Ought one to abort this fetus ? (rather than, Is this fetus a person?); Ought one to discontinue treatment of this patient? (rather than, Is this patient alive or dead ?). Evidently this does not imply that we should reject proposed definitions of death, such as the Harvard criteria, as useless for medical practice. The point is rather that we cannot hope to win acceptance for this type of definition unless we can also win acceptance for the opinion that those who are 'dead' by the Harvard criteria ought not be sustained by further medical interventions. And it is futile to hope to win acceptance for this latter opinion by simply changing our way of talking about the patients whose treatment, or otherwise, is at issue.
